---
title: 'Verify a node — LifeCare.ID®'
description: 'Check in your own browser what software and AI models a LifeCare node says it runs, that the claim was not altered, and whether the key that signed it is the one LifeCare.ID® lists for that node. Zero PHI, ever.'
canonical: https://lifecare.id/verify
generated: 2026-10-08
---
Verify a node — LifeCare.ID®

[LifeCare.ID®](https://lifecare.id/)

Network transparency

# Verify a node

This page checks, **in your own browser**, what software and
AI models a LifeCare node says it runs, that the claim was not altered, and whether
the key that signed it is the one LifeCare.ID® lists for that node. It works for
**any node in the network**.

Check a live node
Paste an attestation

Node address

Verify now
Load example
simulate tampering

Attestation JSON (from `/v1/attestation`)

Verify
Load example
simulate tampering

**What this checks, and what it does not.**
Three checks run here. The measurement recomputes from the response, so nothing
in the claim is hidden. The signature over it is valid for the key the response
carries, so the claim was not altered after that key signed it. And the key's
id (its RFC 7638 thumbprint) is compared with the keys LifeCare.ID® lists for
the node, as published by its operator: **Verified, key known** needs all
three. A valid signature by a key that is not listed reads **Signature valid,
key unknown**, because the quote may come from a different machine. This is
the **software floor**: it is **not yet hardware-rooted**, so an operator
in control of the machine could still publish a consistent claim that is not
true; hardware-rooted attestation closes that gap and is designed in. The key
list is what the node's operator declared; anchoring each key in the node's own
decentralized identifier is the next step.
[Read how the attestation is built and what a pass proves.](https://lifecare.id/attestation)